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I. INTRODUCTION
Public lands cover a third of the United State's total land area. West of
the 100 th meridian that fraction becomes one half of all the land. Public
lands support uses as diverse as mining and pristine wilderness preserva-
tion. The land itself embraces almost every kind of habitat, from tundra to
sub-tropical jungle, but running through it all is a patchwork of private in-
*J.D. expected May of 2006 University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana.
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holdings which have often confounded the ability of the Federal govern-
ment to effectively manage the land.
The public lands did not begin in this fragmented state; they were broken
up because of an awkward attempt to accelerate our Nation's westward
expansion. What was an expedient solution to underwrite the settlement of
the west has become an impediment to the full use and enjoyment of our
public lands, and the Federal government has been trying to consolidate
them ever since.
Over the ensuing years the consolidation method of choice has been the
statutory land exchange. In recent years the statutory land exchange has
been criticized as ineffective and subject to abuse. It has even been de-
scribed as an insider-trading scheme between the land management agen-
cies and corporate America. The question becomes whether statutory land
exchanges are really suitable for the task at hand; making whole the patch-
work that is our public lands.
Part I of this comment on statutory land exchanges addresses the history
that gave rise to the checkerboard public lands. Part II discusses how statu-
tory land exchanges became the management agencies' tool of choice for
consolidating public land. Part III describes the statutory and regulatory
framework which land exchanges must conform to. Part IV reviews the
harsh criticism that has been leveled at the agencies implementing ex-
changes. Part V compares some current alternatives to the statutory land
exchange. Finally, part VI suggests how the statutory land exchange proc-
ess can be amended to address the problems that have plagued exchanges
for the past two decades.
II. A CHECKERED PAST - THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHECKERBOARD LANDS
A. The Golden Horde
Between 1781, when the Articles of Confederation went into effect, and
the purchase of Alaska in 1867, approximately 1.84 billion acres were
added to the land holdings of the United States Government.' If these pub-
lic lands had been divided among the approximately 38 million Americans
tallied in the census of 1870, every man, woman and child would have re-
ceived 48 acres. In its youth, America was indeed land rich. The bounty of
this land wealth seemed endless. However, as with all things of finite value,
the measure of it was quickly to be had, and that measurement is said to
have begun with the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill, California, in 1848.
With that discovery came the California gold rush which marked "a sharp
increase in the settlement of the west.",
2
1. Ryan M. Beaudoin, Student Author, Federal Ownership and Management of America's Public
Lands through Land Exchanges, 4 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 229, 232 (2000).
2. Leo Sheep Co. v. U.S., 440 U.S. 668, 670 (1979).
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At that time millions of people on the eastern seaboard of the United
States were straining to reach out and grab hold of the untold wealth the
west had to offer. The problem was how to locate all these people on the
land. To do so required the creation of vast new lines of communication,
such as railroads, to support the logistics essential to this immigrant army,
this European Golden Horde.3
This immense undertaking was beyond the means of private investors;
the sums of money needed, coupled with the risk entailed, made some form
of government assistance essential.4 What form of assistance would serve
best; direct assistance via government construction projects or loans of cash
to entrepreneurs? The answer turned out to be neither. Instead the Govern-
ment turned to a tried and true method that required no governmental per-
sonnel on the job and no cash from the treasury. The method selected for
solving the problem used the very thing that was so abundant; the 'land
grant'.
During the first half of the 1 9 th century the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral government's participation in public works such as canals, roads and
railroads was hotly debated. It was argued that these were "internal im-
provements" to the states and as such were not within the enumerated pow-
ers of Congress. 5 The Federal government sought a loophole and settled on
the idea of land grants. By offering grants of land, which were constitu-
tional, and by making these grants conditional upon certain use restrictions,
the government could maintain a discreet level of involvement (or perhaps
control) over these internal improvements and yet eschew the constitutional
argument that they had provided direct support for internal improvements
of the states.6
In practice these grants became known as the "checkerboard land
grants." They derived their name from the rectangular survey system en-
acted by the Land Ordnance Act of 1785.7 The survey divided the land into
numbered sections one mile square, giving the map the appearance of a
"checkerboard." Thus divided, the grant gave odd numbered sections to
private entities, such as the railroad companies, while the even numbered
sections were kept by the Federal government.8 While seemingly haphaz-
ard, there was a rationale for this design.
The granting of private land commingled with retained Federal land was
designed to increase the value of the federally held land. As noted above,
rather than expend cash to help capitalize the railways, the government
3. The Golden Horde was the name given to the Asian army of Batu Khan, who crossed the
Russian Steppe and conquered all of Eastern Europe, reaching as far as Germany in 1242.
4. LeoSheepCo.,440USat67l.
5. Id. at 672.
6. See generally George Coggins, Charles Wilkinson, & John Leshy, Federal Public Land &
Resources Law 72 (5th ed., Found. Press 2002).
7. Id. at 47.
8. Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 672.
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traded in land. These grants were not limited to land for the railroad's tracks
but also included land from the surrounding countryside. This land was
given on the condition that the railroads raise their capital from the sale of
this land to settlers, at supposedly affordable prices. The rationale was that
the success of the railroad and settlers would cause all the land situated
along the line to appreciate. Both private land and the Federal land mixed in
with it would go up in value. The government also believed that when the
government's appreciated land was disposed of, the increased price would
offset the expenditure of the original grant of land. 9
B. The Octopus
The key to assessing the checkerboard scheme is to realize that, at that
time, the government viewed itself as merely a custodian of the land until it
could be transferred either to the states or into private hands.' 0 The com-
mingling of private and Federal land was of no import because the Federal
government intended all the land find its way into the settlers' hands, either
from sale by the railroad to satisfy the railroad's conditional grant, or by
direct government sale or homesteading. However, as time would reveal,
neither of the government's aspirations would be met.
First, the railroads typically failed to sell the grant land to the settlers, in-
stead finding it more prosperous to either sell it outright to large timber and
mining corporations or to mortgage the land to its own affiliates and sub-
sidiaries. Congress often facilitated this activity by easing the reversion
provisions when the grant conditions were not met.'" Second, the govern-
ment found itself unable to sell or homestead much of the land it retained.
Two factors no affected the governments ability to profitable use its re-
tained land. First and foremost was the free use of public lands. When the
railroad's successors in interest purchased the checkerboard they had free
rein to utilize the adjoining public land. Why purchase the Federal land
when it could be had for free through use rights such as range grazing
rights. 12 Second, the Homestead Act, west of the 100 t' meridian, did not
permit homesteaders to claim sufficient quantities of land to make home-
steading truly viable.1 3 This was no doubt exacerbated by the fact that
nearly all the government checkerboard land was surrounded by the railroad
and their successors in interest, and had not passed into the hands of other
settlers who would be ready and able to buy and sell on the open market. In
9. Merry J. Chavez, Public Access to Landlocked Public Lands, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1377-78
(1987).
10. See generally Coggins et al., supra n. 6, at 49.
11. Randel Hanson & Giancarlo Panagia, Acts of Bureaucratic Disposition: The Huckleberry Land
Exchange, The Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, and Rational(ized) Forms of Contemporary Appropriation, 7
Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 169, 178 (2002); Coggins et al., supra n. 6, at 91.
12. Coggins et al., supra n. 6, at 92.
13. Id. at 79.
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short, the government land was isolated by land still embraced by the tenta-
cles of the "Great Octopus," the railroad land grant companies and their
successors in interest.
What began as a tool to underwrite rapid westward expansion left the
public lands pocked with private in-holdings. Once the flowing mass of
humanity that was the pioneer settlement of the west began to slow and
finally set, the grants of public land, that solvent which made the flow of
humanity so liquid, evaporated. Retention rather than disposition of public
lands became the definition of acting in the public interest.
C. Consolidation
By the end of the 19th Century the government had committed itself to a
policy of retention of the public lands for multiple uses. 14 The era was
marked by such seminal events as the creation of the world's first national
park at Yellowstone in 1872, followed in 1891 by creation of a national
timber reserve known as the National Forest System. These events typified
a new retention policy that allowed both recreational and economic uses.
From the outset, however, the dispersed nature of the government's lands,
as well as accompanying access problems, created impediments to man-
agement. 15 The answer to the management problem was as true then as it is
today: consolidation.
The checkerboard land grants gave the public lands the appearance of an
ad-hoc assemblage of property which neither public nor private entities
could develop without imposing upon the other. This framework directly
limited both parties from full enjoyment of the value of the land, both in
economic and conservation terms. For example, private in-holdings often
blocked access to government lands, not only for private citizens but for the
government as well. In the landmark case of Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
(1979), the Supreme Court held the government cannot obtain an easement
by necessity to cross private land that blocks access to Federal land. 16 The
Court pointed out that if access was desired the government could use its
power of condemnation. This cumbersome procedure has no doubt limited
the government's access to its own lands. According to some authorities
"[a]pproximately 40 to 60 percent of all public lands in the West have seri-
ous access problems and one-third of the public lands have no legal over-
land access at all."' 17 Thus the land grants created fundamental access and
management problems that needed to be addressed. Although these prob-
lems persist to this day, it was recognized early on that land management
14. Coggins, supra n. 6, at 103.
15. Id.
16. Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 688.
17. Chavez, supra n. 9, at 1373-74.
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tools were needed to consolidate lands atomized by checkerboard land
grants.
D. The Acts
The legislative history at the beginning of the land retention era reveals
how Congress soon realized the need to promote consolidation and address
the fragmented nature of its holdings. From the beginning we see land ex-
changes take an important role in the consolidation process. First came the
Weeks Act of 1911, which gave authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to
"acquire lands to protect watersheds, produce timber, and exchange Federal
lands." 18 This was followed in 1922 by the General Exchange Act, which
gave similar authority to the Secretary of Interior. Not only did the General
Exchange Act provide similar authority, it also set out some of the basic
requirements that have been embodied in all subsequent Federal land ex-
change legislation. In particular the General Exchange Act set out the re-
quirement that exchanges be equal in value, not merely acreage. 19 The Tay-
lor Grazing Act of 1934 further developed the fundamental language of
exchange legislation. 20 This act allowed the 'Grazing Service,' later to be-
come the Bureau of Land Management, to engage in land exchanges of
equal value only if the public interest would benefit from such exchanges.21
In 1976 these acts were either repealed or, as in the case of the Taylor
Grazing Act, supplemented by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA).22 FLPMA embraced a comprehensive approach to Federal
land management. In enacting FLPMA Congress concluded the nation's
interests in public land would "be best realized if the public lands and their
resources [were] periodically and systematically inventoried and their pre-
sent and future use [were] projected through a land use planning process
coordinated with other Federal and State planning efforts.... The land
use planning process was to culminate in the production of regional land
use management plans for all Federal land under FLPMA's purview. It
therefore required the tools used to consolidate Federal lands, such as land
exchanges, be used only in accord with those regional plans. To further this
goal, FLPMA went on to establish uniform statutory procedures for dispos-
als of public land, which included land exchanges. 24 These statutory proce-
dures kept the requirements embodied by earlier land laws, namely the re-
quirement for equal value of the lands exchanged, and modified others.
18. Melanie Tang, SNPLMA, FLTFA, and the Future of Public Land Exchanges, 9 Hastings W.-
N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Policy 55, 57 (2002).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 485.
20. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316o.
21. Hanson & Panagia, supra n. 11, at 181-82.
22. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (2005).
23. 43 U.S.C. § 170 1(a)(2) (2005).
24. Tang, supra n. 18, at 58.
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FLPMA now requires exchanges only be conducted when "the public inter-
est will be well served by making the exchange., 25 In 1988 Congress added
to the statutory framework of FLPMA by passing the Federal Land Ex-
change Facilitation Act (FLEFA).26 FLEFA was designed to facilitate and
expedite the FLPMA exchange process. Its main thrust is the requirement
that the exchange parties use arbitration whenever the proposed land ap-
praisals differ markedly in valuation. As such, FLEFA sets out the current
framework upon which the BLM and the Forest Service promulgated the
regulatory process that controls statutory land exchanges.27
II. WHY STATUTORY LAND EXCHANGES BECAME THE BELLE OF THE BALL
As the 2 0 th Century progressed a new paradigm gradually eclipsed the
access and management efficiency rationale for consolidation. The passage
of FLPMA required Federal agencies to take an approach that uses compre-
hensive, science-based planning to manage the public lands. 28 This legisla-
tion, when taken in concert with the requirement to abide by the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA), set the stage for what became known as "ecosys-
tem management." 29
A. A New Paradigm
When FLPMA and the ESA are read together, the two acts functionally
require agencies to use a holistic approach to public land management. In
short the acts implicitly demand that public lands and the species that in-
habit them be managed as an integrated ecosystem. 30 When taking a holistic
approach to managing ecosystems, scientists have observed that maintain-
ing the biological diversity of plant and animal species is essential if endan-
gered or threatened species are to be preserved. 31 Studies show an ecosys-
tem's biodiversity is best supported by blocks of land large enough to allow
wide-spread species distribution over their native range, and these large
blocks are in every way superior to smaller blocks of land that contain
smaller populations spread far apart. 32 It is this requirement that nature be
considered combined with the new management paradigm of man that is in
large part fueling the modem use of land exchanges. 3
25. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1716(a), 1713 (2005) (emphasis added).
26. Pub. L. No. 100-409, 102 Stat. 1086 (1988).
27. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2090, 2200; 36 C.F.R. § 254 et seq. (2005).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(2) (2002).
29. Coggins et al., supra n. 6, at 711.
30. Id.
31. Robert B. Keiter, Biodiversity Conservation and the Intermixed Ownership Problem: From
Nature Reserves to Collaborative Processes, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 301, 301 (2002).
32. Id. at 304.
33. See e.g. id. at 311.
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B. Alternatives to the Land Exchange - Fickle Choices
The agencies' historical preference for land exchanges is primarily
rooted in the lack of practical alternatives. 34 The agencies can request Con-
gress appropriate money to buy inholdings. This supposes a willing seller,
as well as willingness on the part of Congress to appropriate the funds in
the first place. In deficit years Congress has been more likely to cut the
agencies' operating budgets rather than appropriate money to expand the
land under their management. Even in years where Congress has agreed to
fully fund the agencies, any appropriation bills to expand Federal landhold-
ings has been required to run the gauntlet of vociferous opposition from the
western states. The western states, keen to protect their tax base, have long
favored the position of no net increase in Federal ownership. 35 Taken in
total, this method of consolidation has proven unreliable at best.
However, an alternative method of funding has been made available to
the agencies. The fickle nature of congressional appropriations for land
purchases led to the passage of legislation to create a fund dedicated to the
purchase of inholdings and environmentally sensitive lands. The fund is
called the Land and Water Conservation Fund,36 (LWCF) and federal leases
of offshore oil and gas rights generate its money. All told the LWCF re-
ceives approximately $900 million a year.37 However, the use of the
LWCF is not within the discretion of the agencies; a congressional appro-
priation from the LWCF is required for each purchase.38 Additionally,
since LWCF's inception, Congress has consistently diverted the funds to
other uses, generally making only one fifth of those monies available. 39 The
Forest Service views the availability of those funds as so unpredictable, it
took a court order to force them to even consider using those funds under
the NEPA requirement to look at reasonable alternatives to a land ex-
change. 40 To quote the Service, they saw the availability of LCWF funds as
41too "remote and speculative" to be considered as a worthwhile alternative.
Although a Federal court disagreed with this assessment, it does indicate
the regard that the Forest Service has for the reliability of funding derived
from the LCWF.
Another alternative to land exchanges is the power of condemnation, but
this is not a power currently available to agencies such as the Forest Service
or the BLM. Per section 1715(a) of FLPMA, the use of eminent domain is
34. Nicholas G. Vaskov , Continued Cartographic Chaos, or a New Paradigm in Public Land
Reconfiguration? The Effect of New Laws Authorizing Limited Sales of Public Land, 20 UCLA J. Envtl.
L. & Policy 79, 83 (2001).
35. Keiter, supra n. 31, at 310.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-09 (2005).
37. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 83-84.
38. Keiter, supra n. 31, at 311.
39. Id.
40. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U. S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1999).
41. Id.
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only available to the Secretaries, and is only allowed when access to Fed-
eral land is blocked. The power to condemn land is further restricted to as
narrow a corridor as is necessary to gain access. 42 Ultimately the agencies
must prevail on Congress to summon the political will to do the dastardly
deed and confiscate an unwilling landowner's property. Besides the politi-
cal price to be paid for condemnation, the agencies must persuade Congress
to pay the required monetary price, for the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution mandates that condemnation requires just compensa-
tion.43
At the end of the day, land exchanges began to look pretty good to the
agencies. In an exchange, the agencies need not rely on any appropriations,
the coin in trade being the very land under their control. Further, it is within
their discretion to enter into an exchange, 44 and once entered, those ex-
changes under one hundred and fifty thousand dollars (and meeting certain
requirements) require no Congressional notification,45 and can go forward
under the sole authority and supervision of the agency's field manage-
ment.46 In addition, the western states' lobby against the erosion of their tax
base is appeased because, in theory, there is no net gain or loss in property.
As far as the agencies are concerned, land exchanges have become the
belle of the ball. It has been the BLM's stated policy to use land exchanges
whenever feasible for land acquisitions.47 The Forest Service has pursued
an equally aggressive agenda; executing over 1,200 exchanges valued in
excess of a billion dollars in the 1990s alone.48 In recent years however,
this roaring business has drawn close scrutiny. This scrutiny has revealed
that although the agencies may be marching toward a noble goal, the goal
of consolidation of their fragmented land, it has often come at a price not
always apparent to the agencies. Close examination of their exchange trans-
actions has revealed that the agencies have consistently undervalued key
economic, biological and aesthetic values associated with the lands they
gave up. To understand this oversight one needs to understand how an ex-
change is conducted, as well as the typical parties to an exchange.
III. THE STATUTORY LAND EXCHANGE
FLPMA is the modem authority for statutory land exchanges. It provides
that, inter alia, the exchange must meet three fundamental requirements:
first, the purpose and effect of the exchange must conform to the agencies
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a).
43. U.S. Const. amend. V.
44. 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(a) (2005).
45. 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(k) (2005).
46. 36 C.F.R. § 254.11 (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2201.5 (2005).
47. G.A.O., BLM and the Forest Service: Land Exchanges Need to Reflect Appropriate Value and
Serve the Public Interest, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00073.pdf (June 7, 2000) [hereinafter GAO].
48. Id. at 11.
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land use plan.49 Second, the values of the lands exchanged should be equal,
or be equalized by a payment of money. 50 Third, the exchange may only be
consummated if the agency finds the "public interest will be well served by
making that exchange.' When the parties enter into an exchange those
requirements are carried out under the regulatory framework authorized by
FLPMA, and as amended by FLEFA. Regulations have been promulgated
by both the Forest Service and the BLM, but they are essentially identical.
5 2
A. The Mechanics
The Forest Service and BLM regulations attempt to fulfill FLPMA's di-
rectives by using a four step process: 1) Proposal Scoping and Development
2) Feasibility Phase, 3) Processing Phase and 4) Decision.
Under the Proposal Scoping and Development Phase an exchange may
be proposed by the agencies, a private party (including corporations), or a
third party facilitator5 3 who takes on responsibility for putting the deal to-
gether for both the agency and the private party. Once the proposal is made
the agency scopes the proposal and makes a preliminary assessment of
whether the proposal meets the agency land management plan and whether
it generally conforms to the other statutory and regulatory requirements. At
this point the agency may suggest ways to improve the proposal.5 4 Once the
informal talks with the agency field staff are complete and they have given
the proponent of the exchange an indication that the proposal is worth pur-
suing, the next step is for the proponent to submit a formal proposal, 55 and
so begins the feasibility phase.
Upon receipt of a formal proposal the agency will generate a feasibility
analysis report.56 This report addresses the major resource values involved
and formally makes a determination of whether the proposal conforms to
the agency's existing land management plans, FLPMA's first directive. The
feasibility report then discusses the possibility of conflicts or problems, and
finally estimates the cost of processing the exchange and states who is ex-
pected to bear those costs. 57 Based on this report the agency will decide
whether to enter into a non-binding agreement to initiate the exchange
process and commence the NEPA studies.
An exchange initiation agreement sets out the parties' duties to generate
the required reports and sets out the costs each party is to bear processing
49. 43 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2002).
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(b) (2002).
51. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (2002).
52. 36 C.F.R. § 254 (2005) et seq.; 43 C.F.R. §§ 2090, 2200 (2005).
53. 36 C.F.R. § 254.4(a), (c)(3) (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2201.1(a), (c)(3) (2005).
54. BLMLand Exchange Handbook, H-2200-1, 7 (August 1997).
55. 36 C.F.R. § 254.4(a) (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2200.1(a) (2005).
56. Elizabeth Kitchens Jones, Acquiring Federal and State Land through Land Exchanges, 9 Utah
B. J. 19, 20-21 (July 1996).
57. Id.
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the exchange.5 8 It is of note that during the processing phase, "[o]ne or
more of the parties may assume, without compensation, all or part of the
costs." 59 This is significant because it allows the agency to defer all the
costs to the private exchange party (read corporation). This practice has
gone so far as to allow the direct payment of agency officials' salaries while
they are engaged in compiling the reports. 60 The compiled reports include,
inter alia, an environmental impact review as required by NEPA, a cultural
and historic resource inventory as required by the National Historic Preser-
vation Act, and an appraisal of the value of the lands to be exchanged. 61 It
is this last report, the land value appraisal, which informs the agency as to
whether FLPMA's 'exchange must be of equal value' directive has been
satisfied.62 However, it is the aggregate of all these reports which is used in
deciding FLPMA's overarching directive - that the "public interest will be
well served by making that exchange". It is upon that analysis the agency
enters the final phase and renders a final decision. Once the decision is
made the agency will give public notice, and for a 45 day period eligible
63parties may object to the decision.
B. The Real World
As we have seen, FLPMA requires certain principles of public policy be
met when exchanges are conducted, and the regulations are designed to
implement those requirements. But as with all things worldly there is the
knowing of it and then there is the doing of it.
In practice, land exchanges seem to take place in an insular world and
typically involve the same or very similar parties most of the time. An ex-
amination of the land exchange notices posted in the Federal Register re-
veals that the agencies are generally negotiating for land consolidation for
the protection of endangered species or preservation of land that is either
environmentally sensitive or contains public recreation opportunities. How-
ever, the private parties are predominately represented by corporations from
the resource extraction industries who, through their mining and timber
operations, are already intensive users of Federal lands. 64 As intensive users
of Federal lands, these corporations have working relationships with the
agencies which, in some cases, go back to the agencies' very inception. The
familiarity of the parties has called into question whether land exchange
58. 36 C.F.R. § 254.4 (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2201.1 (2005).
59. 36 C.F.R. § 254.7(a)(1) (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2201.1-3(a)(1) (2005).
60. Vaskov, supra, n. 34, at 91-92.
61. BLM Land Exchange Handbook, H-2200-1, 19-28 (August 1997).
62. 43 USCS § 1716(h).
63. 36 C.F.R. § 254.13(b) (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2201.7-1(b)-(c) (2005).
64. Jones, supra n. 56, at 22.
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negotiations are actually taking place at 'arms length,' and in accordance
with the statutes and regulations.65
IV. CRITIQUE OF STATUTORY LAND EXCHANGES - THE GAO WEIGHS IN
Over the past decade there has been harsh criticism of the efficacy of the
land exchange process, culminating in 2000 with the Government Account-
ing Office's (GAO) recommendation of a moratorium on all exchanges
conducted by the agencies. 66 How did it come to this and what are the ma-
jor criticisms leveled at the agencies? The issues turn primarily upon the
agencies' interpretation of two of FLPMA's prime directives: (1) that the
exchange must be in return for land of equal value, and (2) that an exchange
only be made if it well serves the public interest.
A. Appraising the Appraisers
The appraisal of land values is seen as one of the most critical stages in
the exchange process. The appraisal underlies the agencies' determination
that the lands exchanged are of equal or approximately equal value.
The appraiser is tasked by statute and regulation with determining the
market value of the land based on two elements. First, the appraiser must
determine the 'highest and best use of the land.' This is defined as the most
67probable legal use of the property. Second, once the highest and best use
has been determined, the appraiser determines the market value of such
property based on "the most probable price in cash, or terms equivalent to
cash, that [such] lands ... should bring in a competitive . . . market...
,68 When making this analysis the appraiser shall "[i]nclude historic, wild-
life, recreation, wilderness, scenic, cultural, or other resource values or
amenities as reflected in prices paid for similar properties in the competitive
market. ' 6
9
On its face the appraisal system appears as though it will capture all the
tangible and intangible values associated with the land, and reduce them to
a fungible cash equivalent for equal value comparison. At least it should in
a perfect world where similar amenities and properties have already been
valued on the competitive market and can be used as a yardstick. As the
GAO pointed out in their audit of the exchange program, a fundamental
problem arises when there is no functional market for remote lands or the
unique properties that may be associated with them.7° Critics urge that this
is the inherent weakness of exchanges because, in effect, what we have is a
65. Tang, supra n. 18, at 62.
66. GAO, supra n. 47, at 6.
67. 36 C.F.R. § 254.2 (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2200.0-5(k) (2005).
68. 36 C.F.R. § 254.2 (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 2200.0-5(n) (2005).
69. 36 C.F.R. § 254.9(b)(iii) (2005), 43 C.F.R. § 2201.3-2(a)(3) (2005).
70. Keiter, supra n. 31, at 313.
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barter system. The parties have no objective standard of value, which in
turn creates difficulty in determining whether the trade was fair.7'
The criticism regarding objective standards has some validity, but it does
not seem to hold true for all parties or all exchanges. This becomes apparent
when we look at instances where private parties have acquired land in an
exchange and then subsequently sold it for a greatly appreciated price. The
classic example comes from the GAO report on land exchanges. The BLM
traded 70 acres of Las Vegas land valued at $763,000, whereupon the pri-
vate party sold the land for $4.6 million the same day.72 Obviously the
valuation was woefully inadequate, but only from the agency's perspective.
The private party faired quite well. In fact there are no examples of where
the private parties did anything but fair well. Whatever valuation system the
private parties were using, in comparison to the government they seem to
be doing a far better job of anticipating the market price. As one congres-
sional wag put it, the agencies seem to have "flat got snookered. ' ' 73 So the
question becomes, if private parties' valuation can be successful, why have
government valuations consistently come up short? To answer that question
we must examine the conditions under which government valuations take
place.
Review of the agency appraisal work demonstrates fundamental errors
committed by agency appraisers and their supervisors. First and foremost is
the failure of appraisers to employ standard government appraisal proce-
dures. The GAO found this failure led to the agencies giving "more than
fair market value for nonfederal land they acquired and accept[ing] less
than fair market value for federal land they conveyed." 74 A subcategory of
this is appraisers' failure to make proper use of 'highest and best use'
analysis. The 9th Circuit has noted that failure to take into account the
highest and best use of land in the hands of a private party significantly
skews the appraisal value because it does not consider the development or
resale value of the Federal property. 75 "Stringent application of the "highest
and best use" standard is imperative in light of the fact that both the BLM
and the Forest Service consistently undervalue Federal lands at the expense
of the taxpayer.
' 76
Other reviews have found further operational flaws in the agencies' ap-
praisal work. In a study similar to the GAO's, the Appraisal Foundation
listed several serious defects in the way the BLM carried out their apprais-
71. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 88.
72. GAO, supra n. 47, at 19.
73. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 79.
74. GAO, supra n. 47, at 4.
75. Desert Citizens against Pollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2000).
76. Amy Stengel, Student Author, "Insider's Game" or Valuable Land Management Tool? Cur-
rent Issues in the Federal Land Exchange Program, 14 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 567, 590-91 (2001).
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als.77 The Foundation noted it was the policy of the BLM to encourage ap-
praiser involvement in direct negotiations and bargaining with the private
party. The Foundation saw this practice as highly prejudicial to the apprais-
ers' independence and created a coercive pressure on the appraisers to con-
form their appraisal to the bargained-for position. The Foundation called
this policy a "material weakness., 78 The Foundation determined the failure
of the agencies' appraisal process was also due to the highly politicized
climate in which the exchange process takes place. The Foundation cited
the practice of non-appraisers acting in appraisal roles and their subsequent
"interference with or failure to procure objective and independent market
value opinions. 79
The reports demonstrate it is not the government appraisal standards that
set up the agencies to get snookered. Rather it is the agencies' leadership
failure for not having the discipline to properly abide by established stan-
dards. It would, however, be simplistic to say that slavishly adhering to
proper appraisal standards can account for all the disparity in valuation be-
tween the exchange and a subsequent greater valuation at auction. There are
market forces inherent to auction dynamics that no appraisal can capture or
ever hope to capture. On this basis some would say the obvious answer is to
substitute auctions for exchanges, and thus the market valuation question
will in effect be self-executing. But, this potential solution does not account
for some major pitfalls, which are examined infra, in part V of this paper.
B. Public Interest Determination
The determination of whether the exchange "well serves" the public in-
terest is the most important issue for the agency to decide. This is also an
issue in which the agency is given great discretion. The agency is essen-
tially asked to make a valuation of the public interests in the Federal and
non-Federal land. After valuation, the agency is asked to balance the two
valuations, and decide if the "resource values and the public objectives
served by the non-Federal lands ... [are] equal [to] or exceed the resource
values and the public objectives served by the Federal lands to be con-
veyed.",80 If the public interest value of the non-Federal lands do not equal
or exceed those of the Federal land the agency must reject the exchange.
Thus the public interest question becomes, what are these values and how
are they weighed?
FLPMA and its regulations give the agency a non-exclusive list of fac-
tors to consider when making pubic interest valuation. The agency must
consider if the land will provide for "better Federal land management and
77. Jeremy Eyre, The San Rafael Swell and the Difficulties in State-Federal Land Exchanges, 23 J.
Land Resources & Envtl. L. 269, 287 (2003).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 286.
80. 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(b)(2)(i) (2005).
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the needs of State and local people, including needs for lands for the econ-
omy, community expansion, recreation areas, food, fiber, minerals, and fish
and wildlife."'" The agency is tasked with making the consideration of
these factors part of their record of decision, but the statute does not assign
any weight or relative rank to the factors. Therefore the agencies have been
given wide discretion to decide this balancing test. The test is in fact a sub-
jective one to which the courts will defer, unless the determination clearly
does not fall within the boundaries of FLPMA's legislative purpose.82
Although the agencies have wide latitude in deciding public interest, they
do not have the latitude to ignore analysis or treat decisions in a cavalier
fashion. Some of the most damning criticism leveled at the agencies has
cited just such agency indiscretion. The GAO report noted they had encoun-
tered numerous examples where the agencies had failed to even consider
the required factors when deciding if the exchanges matched or exceeded
the benefits of retaining the Federal land. 3 In one particularly egregious
example the BLM wished to acquire an old bowling alley as the site for
their headquarters in Elko, Nevada. In return the BLM personnel merely
told the owner to select a parcel from a map of the BLM holdings in Ne-
vada. The gentleman selected a parcel in Las Vegas, which is reported to be
currently valued at over $9 million.84 As with the issue of valuation, this
sort of failure to honor public interest has more to do with a failure of lead-
ership rather than the failure of the public interest analysis itself. Public
interest analysis has not however, escaped criticism.
The lack of objective standards when it comes to the agencies' evaluation
of the public interest factors vests the agencies with such wide latitude there
are virtually no limitations on agency action. So long as the agency makes
some determination within the broad bounds of FLPMA's legislative pur-
pose the courts will not interfere. 85 Some would argue this allows the
agency to willfully escape any meaningful public interest determination.
Another criticism is that the exchange process does not allow for much,
if any, public scrutiny or comment. The negotiations take place in private
and the land appraisals are kept confidential until the exchange has been
completed. Formal request for public comment does not come until after the
agency has made its determination.8 6 Without timely access to the apprais-
als, and other information, it is doubtful if the public is ever in an effective
position to evaluate whether the exchange will well-serve the public inter-
est. With the formal request to comment at the end of the process, com-
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (2002).
82. Eyre, supra n. 77, at 272-73.
83. GAO, supra n. 47, at 4.
84. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 88.
85. Eyre, supra n. 77, at 273, (quoting State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir.
1992)).
86. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 89.
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ments serve little more than an attempt to close the barn door after the horse
has bolted.
These two critiques are doubly damning when we recall that the private
parties to the exchanges are generally intensive users of the public lands
who have close ties to the agencies. Given the less-than-arms-length nature
of the relationship (recall the practice of the corporations underwriting the
exchange process), the confidential nature of the land appraisals and bar-
gaining, as well as the agencies latitude to determine public interest with
little or no meaningful public scrutiny, it is no surprise that land exchanges
have been characterized as a game of insider trading. The GAO called on
Congress to consider halting all land exchange programs, 87 and the Ap-
praisal Foundation called for an investigation by the Department of Jus-
88tice. 8 But none of that has come to pass. The agencies have undertaken
some reform of their land exchange guidelines, but exchanges are still
available to the agencies under the same statutory and regulatory terms. To
understand why this is so we must look at the proposed alternatives, or what
would otherwise come to pass if statutory exchanges were banned.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE STATUTORY LAND EXCHANGE - THROWING THE
BABY OUT WITH THE BATHWATER
There is a fear that if statutory land exchanges were to end, the effect
would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater, as the agencies are not
the only ones who conduct land exchanges; Congress does as well.
A. Legislative Exchanges
Legislative exchanges have always injected an overtly political compo-
nent into the exchange process and have typically come about when par-
ticularly large or contentious land exchanges are at issue. 89 They have
drawn strong criticism because legislative exchanges have overridden envi-
ronmental laws, negated appraisal requirements and eliminated public in-
volvement. 
90
Because of the nature of legislative exchanges there is an argument that
statutory exchanges are the lesser of two evils. The concern is if statutory
land exchanges were removed, then less desirable legislative exchanges will
fill the vacuum. It would appear that statutory land exchanges remain be-
cause, in many respects, they offer a greater likelihood of achieving ex-
changes that are in the public interest.
87. GAO, supra n. 47, at 6.
88. Eyre, supra n. 77, at 287.
89. Keiter, supra n. 31, at 315.
90. Id. at 316.
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B. FLTFA -A New Take on an Old Problem
The concern over legislative exchanges is not the only reason why land
exchanges have remained entrenched. There have been legislative experi-
ments with other mechanisms which have raised little interest to date, and
perhaps rightfully so. The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act of
2000 (FLTFA) 91 has been the main contender to statutory land exchanges
in recent years. This act looks to solve the land appraisal / market value
problem by allowing the agency to identify their surplus lands, theoretically
the ones they would give in a land exchange, sell them at auction and retain
the funds (rather than have them go to the Treasury where it would take
Congressional appropriation to retrieve them). The agency then dedicates
these funds to the purchase of lands with exceptional natural resource value
or for the purchase of fragmented lands. On its surface FLTFA does appear
to cure poor appraisals, but it does so only for part of the transaction.
Land transactions under FLTFA have some marked drawbacks of their
own. While perhaps offering a solution to the appraisal problem, it is only a
solution for appraisal of the land that the agency is willing sell. FLTFA still
fails to account for the appraisal of the land yet to be purchased, and at the
same time makes it difficult to judge if the transaction well serves the pub-
lic interest. Simply stated the transaction converts the lands into cash and
commingles it in the fund together. Now the inherent value of the land is no
longer readily apparent. When the cash is paid out for the replacement
property there is no sense of what value, or how much land has just been
traded for the replacement property. So the problem remains, how do you
measure units of ecological aesthetics against commercial potential? With
FLTFA this measurement merely becomes more obscu'e because inherent
value has been divorced from one side of the transaction. At least in the
land exchange, a stark contrast may be revealed when the lands are exam-
ined side by side.
92
FLTFA may have other undesirable side effects. Not only does it obscure
how much land was sold to make a particular purchase, it may further en-
courage what is called eco-speculation or green mail. This is an old form of
speculation with a new twist. In the past a developer might have got wind
of a government project and purchased land in advance of that project
knowing they can get an appreciated price for it when the project takes
place. In eco-speculation "private wheeler-dealers have found it profitable
to buy scenic land and merely threaten to log it or build a road on it; the
screams of outrage guarantee they'll get a spectacular trade when they fi-
nally do hand it over to public ownership. 93
91. 43 U.S.C. § 2302 (2005).
92. Tang, supra n. 18, at 71.
93. Id. at 72.
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An old criticism of land exchanges was that people with inholdings could
force land exchanges to take place by creating a credible threat.94 A classic
example of creating a credible threat occurred when the Noranda Corpora-
tion proposed opening the New World Mine on the border of Yellowstone
National Park. To quote Park Ranger Stuart Coleman: "If you were going to
throw a dart at a map of the United States and place a gold mine there,
those mountains would probably be the worst place a dart could land. That's
exactly what Noranda is doing, and we are very concerned about it." 95 This
provoked so much outrage the Clinton administration brokered a land ex-
change in return for stopping the development. However, and this is the
trick of the tale, Noranda claimed that none of the replacement lands of-
fered were satisfactory. In the end the government had to settle with a large
cash buyout. Availability of a large agency-owned cash fund under FLFTA
may have the unintended effect of further fueling this sort of speculation.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD
So we have come full circle, left with the only date for the dance, the
land exchange. There are glaring problems, but the land exchange has such
a history and is so entrenched with the agencies it does not seem likely to
be on its way out. But is that all there is to it? Obviously not. People have
made recommendations at every turn. The agencies themselves have taken
steps to remedy what was seen as their failures in leadership and process.
96
But more can be done.
If reduced to a formula, one might say the answer to fragmented or en-
dangered lands equals a 'statutory land exchange' that realizes 'appropriate
land values' and 'well serves the public interest'. A simple enough para-
phrase of FLPMA's exchange policy to be sure, but each component does
have the potential to help forward FLPMA's overarching policy: the public
lands shall be managed in a manner that will protect their inherent qualities
on the basis of multiple use.9 7 So let us look at possible ways forward for
each component.
A. The Statutory Land Exchange
First, the "statutory land exchange" itself. The format of the statutory
land exchange in many ways is already equipped to further the policy ra-
tionale behind the other components of the formula. The statutory land ex-
change, as opposed to other forms of exchange, requires the use of the
NEPA, NHPA and HAZMAT evaluations. These ready-made evaluation
94. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 90.
95. Peter Dykstra, Student Author, Defining the Mother Lode: Yellowstone National Park v. The
New World Mine, 24 Ecology L.Q. 299, 302 (1997).
96. See generally GAO, supra n. 47,40-82 ("Comments from the Forest Service & BLM").
97. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2002).
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tools currently play key roles in determining what serves the public interest.
But more than anything the statutory land exchange affords people the op-
portunity to place two parcels of land side by side and compare them. Such
a comparison allows us the opportunity to make a normative judgment call
about their equality. This is simply not available if one of the parcels has
been transmogrified into cash.
B. Appropriate Land Values
FLPMA's definition of appropriate value calls for the determination of
the land's fair market value. Some argue that fair market value can not be
realized without some form of competitive bid. But as we have seen, that
only supplies a value for one of the parcels and causes the intangible values
of that parcel to disappear from the equation.
Other valuation standards beside market value have been suggested; of
note is the concept of "replacement value," which has been used in the con-
text of federal acquisition of Indian lands. The replacement or substitute
value looks to capture the unique characteristics of land that has no active
market. 98 Replacement value it is reasoned, may do a more accurate job of
translating the values of the old land into the values of the new land, and
thus ensure greater equality. 99 Unfortunately this may be too rigorous of a
requirement. Finding a sufficient match may make most exchanges impos-
sible to consummate if the exchange is required to reproduce value-for-
value and feature-for-feature. One must also ask what would be the incen-
tive, for either party, to trade for something they already have a close ap-
proximation of? For some it is this diversity of interests that actually drives
the transaction. In an exchange known as the Huckleberry Exchange, the
Forest Service received several thousand acres of highly logged land in
return for a few hundred acres of old growth forest. 1 00 As one Forest Ser-
vice Supervisor notably remarked "I'm probably one of the few people in
the Forest Service who thinks it's better to get land than trees ... You can
grow trees - but not land."' 0'1
The answer may be right before us, but with some modification. The ap-
praisal system currently in place is quite comprehensive. It does specifically
require that aesthetic and ecological values be counted. Most of the criti-
cism leveled at the appraisals has more to do with following correct proce-
dure and stamping out factors that introduce bias. One suggestion put for-
ward is the creation of an independent governmental appraisal agency. 0 2
This appraisal agency should be supplied with more stringent guidelines
98. Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains. Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian Country
in the Twenty-first Century, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 425,495-96 (summer 1998).
99. Id.
100. Tang,supran. 18, at71.
101. Id.
102. Eyre, supra n. 77, at 293.
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and should be completely divorced from those who are ultimately responsi-
ble for approving the exchange. In this way the accuracy and validity of
their appraisals should be relieved of the potential for bias that plagues the
current system.
C. Well Serves the Public Interest
The last and most complex component in the formula is the determina-
tion of whether the exchange well serves the public interest. Here the prob-
lem is the amount of discretion afforded the agencies in making their public
interest determination. Given the typical relationship of the parties and the
likelihood for undue political pressure, this broad latitude allows harried
administrators to conveniently escape a meaningful public interest analysis.
There are four things that can be done to correct this.
First, FLPMA, the enabling statue for statutory land exchanges, should
be amended to explicitly require a "substantial evidence" standard of judi-
cial review for statutory land exchanges. The current public interest analy-
sis requires the agencies to consider if the exchange will provide better
Federal land management and meet the economic, community, and envi-
ronmental needs of the people. In essence FLPMA requires the agencies to
determine if the exchange is reasonable under those terms. This is subjec-
tive in nature and without more the Supreme Court has consistently said it
will not interfere with the agencies' interpretation of those factors. On this
basis courts may only review the agency decisions under the arbitrary and
capricious standard,10 3 which merely asks the courts to consider whether
the agency based their decision on the permitted factors. "The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency ... [s]o long as
there is a rational basis for the agency's decision."' 1 4
The agencies will continue to follow the path of least resistance if they
are allowed to merely substantiate their decision making by showing they
took permitted factors into consideration. No truly searching inquiry will be
had on the efficacy of their actions. Congress must provide a specific man-
date that will allow the court to review the agency's decision for conformity
with statutory intent. Merely asking the agency to analyze what is reason-
able will inevitably require the court to give way to the agency's discretion
under the doctrine of deference to administrative decisions. 105
What sort of specific mandate can Congress give? Making an objective
test out of public interest determination is not particularly practical. Such an
attempt cannot take into account the myriad of possibilities that make up
what might be in the public interest. Therefore, such a test is not possible
103. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
104. Brian C. Whipps, Student Author, Substantial Evidence Supporting the Clearly Erroneous
Standard of Review: The PTO Faces off against the Federal Circuit, 24 Wn. Mitchell L. Rev. 1127,
1132 (1998).
105. Wilderness Socy. v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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because at some point someone really must decide what is reasonable. The
true problem is that the process has long been subject to abuse. So long as
the agency comes up with any rational explanation for their decision within
the boundary set by FLPMA, the courts, and thus the people, are powerless
to intervene. The agencies, like most people, would no doubt do better if
they knew they were held to a more exacting standard. To address this
problem Congress should amend FLPMA to explicitly require the "substan-
tial evidence" standard of judicial review. This will allow the courts to ask
"whether a 'reasonable mind' would accept the evidence 'as adequate to
form a conclusion. ', ' 0 6 If the agency fails to meet this test the court may
set aside the agencies decision. It is this sort of probing, in-depth review,
with actual consequences, which will require the agency to make a more
exhaustive analysis of what is in the public interest.
Second, information about the terms of the exchange negotiations and the
appraisals must be shared earlier in the process. Without this information
there can be no meaningful commentary on the agencies' determination of
what well serves the public interest. Without knowing the terms of the deal
no one is in a position to raise objections because it withholds from them
the ability to make a side by side comparison, the very thing that is so
unique to the land exchange. The confidentiality of the private party's in-
formation should be waived as a price of doing business on the public
lands. Releasing the information at the end of the exchange makes "the
formal request for public comment become little more then a minister's call
for objections at a wedding."''0 7
Third, the cost sharing provisions that the regulations currently contain
should be amended. The regulations currently allow the private party to
assume all the costs of processing the exchange, including providing their
own contractors for the land appraisals and the NEPA analysis. They have
even gone so far as to subsidize the salaries of agency officials working on
the exchange. This practice introduces opportunities for bias to occur and
must end. The Federal government must bear its own costs.
Finally, we come to the determination of whether an exchange of lands is
in the public interest. This determination is so contentious primarily be-
cause so many different parties have an opinion as to what the public inter-
est is, but only one party, the agency, is allowed to make that determination.
Here FLTFA contains a very worthwhile provision. It calls for a collabora-
tive planning process between state and Federal governments to select the
lands that are to be disposed of. As one commentator put it, "[f]rom a cer-
tain perspective, the public interest issue is inherently taken care of ...
because the statutes require a collaborative planning process."' 0 8 This col-
106. Whipps, supra n. 104, at 1132.
107. Vaskov, supra n. 34, at 89.
108. Tang, supra n. 18, at 74.
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laborative planning process should be extended to FLPMA. The collabora-
tive committee should be composed of Federal, state, local and tribal repre-
sentatives, specifically tasked with deciding which land to exchange. In this
way, at least for the lands to be given up in an exchange, the public interest
determination would to some degree be self-realizing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Almost from its inception, checkerboard lands have proved to be a major
impediment to the full enjoyment of public and private lands. These atom-
ized lands have spurred statutory efforts to address the management and
access issues created by fragmented land holdings. The statutory land ex-
change has risen to prominence among those legislative efforts.
The utility of statutory land exchanges has made them the darling of the
land management agencies, and in the past thirty years the paradigm of
ecosystem land management has fueled their use to the point where statu-
tory land exchanges have become the agencies' consolidation tool of
choice.
This considerable popularity has come with a downside. As the GAO and
the Appraisal Foundation have pointed out, the agencies have consistently
accepted lands of lesser value than the land they give up. In addition, it is
alleged that the inability to obtain lands of equal value has been the product
of a game of insider trading with private parties.
When we examine the alternatives to statutory land exchanges it be-
comes apparent that the alternatives are not any better. In fact some may be
considerably worse. Although statutory land exchanges are imperfect and
have been subject to abuse, a land exchange does allow a direct comparison
between the land to be acquired and the land given up. We should not throw
the baby out with the bathwater. What is required, rather, is a revision of
the statutory scheme that curbs abuse and forwards the legislative intent
underlying this worthy land consolidation tool.
To effectively reform statutory land exchanges several key issues must
be addressed. First, the appraisal system must be revised. An independent
appraisal service should be created to check the bias introduced into ap-
praisals done by the same management team rendering the final decision on
the exchange. Second, several aspects of the public interest valuation proc-
ess must also be revised. To begin with, the agencies should be held to a
higher level of judicial review so they are less likely to pay mere lip service
to public interest determination. Next, the terms of the exchange negotia-
tions must be made public so meaningful public comments can be made.
Third, the practice of allowing private parties to subsidize the agency's de-
cision-making costs should be discontinued. Finally, a joint committee of
the Federal, state, local and tribal governments should be tasked with selec-
tion of the public land to be given up. In these ways the statutory land ex-
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change may continue to help address the two hundred-year-old question of
how to consolidate our fragmented public lands.

